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The neuropsychological phenomenon of blindsight has been taken to suggest that the pri-
mary visual cortex (V1) plays a unique role in visual awareness, and that extrastriate acti-
vation needs to be fed back to V1 in order for the content of that activation to be
consciously perceived. The aim of this review is to evaluate this theoretical framework
and to revisit its key tenets. Firstly, is blindsight truly a dissociation of awareness and
visual detection? Secondly, is there sufﬁcient evidence to rule out the possibility that the
loss of awareness resulting from a V1 lesion simply reﬂects reduced extrastriate respon-
siveness, rather than a unique role of V1 in conscious experience? Evaluation of these argu-
ments and the empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that the loss of phenomenal
awareness in blindsight may not be due to feedback activity in V1 being the hallmark
awareness. On the basis of existing literature, an alternative explanation of blindsight is
proposed. In this view, visual awareness is a ‘‘global’’ cognitive function as its hallmark
is the availability of information to a large number of perceptual and cognitive systems;
this requires inter-areal long-range synchronous oscillatory activity. For these oscillations
to arise, a speciﬁc temporal proﬁle of neuronal activity is required, which is established
through recurrent feedback activity involving V1 and the extrastriate cortex. When V1 is
lesioned, the loss of recurrent activity prevents inter-areal networks on the basis of oscil-
latory activity. However, as limited amount of input can reach extrastriate cortex and some
extrastriate neuronal selectivity is preserved, computations involving comparison of neural
ﬁring rates within a cortical area remain possible. This enables ‘‘local’’ read-out from spe-
ciﬁc brain regions, allowing for the detection and discrimination of basic visual attributes.
Thus blindsight is blind due to lack of ‘‘global’’ long-range synchrony, and it functions via
‘‘local’’ neural readout from extrastriate areas.
 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Investigations into the effect of posterior occipital lesions on human visual perception have concluded that the induced
ﬁeld defects are absolute (Holmes, 1918; Horton & Hoyt, 1991).1 However, when assessed through forced choice paradigms,
some patients with V1 damage are able to detect stimuli presented in their blind ﬁeld, despite reporting a complete lack ofV1 lesion
atients in
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patients was able to localize visual stimuli presented in their blind ﬁeld with eye movements. Subsequently it was shown that
patients with V1 damage can localize unseen stimuli also by pointing, even more accurately so than by eye movements (see
Cowey, 2004, 2010 for reviews). This detection and discrimination ability in the absence of visual experience is known as blind-
sight (Weiskranz, Warrington, Sanders, & Marshall, 1974). Intriguingly, blindsight is not merely a subcortical phenomenon, as
extrastriate regions in the damaged hemisphere can be activated by blind ﬁeld stimuli (e.g. Goebel, Muckli, Zanella, Singer, &
Stoerig, 2001; Rodman, Gross, & Albright, 1989a; Schmid, Panagiotaropoulos, Augath, Logothetis, & Smirnakis, 2009), and these
activations are functionally signiﬁcant, as their disruption by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) impairs blindsight per-
formance (Alexander & Cowey, 2009). Blindsight is likely to be mediated by pathways projecting directly to extrastriate cortex,
bypassing V1 (Cowey & Stoerig, 1989; Rodman, Gross, & Albright, 1989b; Schmid et al., 2010).
The failure of extrastriate activation to reach awareness when V1 is lesioned, despite the ability of this activation to guide
visual detection, appeared to suggest unique role for V1 in visual awareness. Blindsight thus challenged, together with a
number of electrophysiological ﬁndings, the strictly hierarchical feedforward models of visual processing in which V1
was viewed as merely a source of extrastriate input (e.g. Crick & Koch, 1995). This led to a shift towards models emphasizing
the role of recurrent processing in visual awareness, a view which gained substantial support primarily from brain stimula-
tion studies carried out in both blindsight patients as well as in neurologically normal observers. However, the picture has
recently been complicated by demonstrations of conscious experience in blindsight, as well as by evidence implicating feed-
back activity in V1 in all visual processing, whether conscious or not.
The aim of the present manuscript is to review these developments. Firstly, I will discuss the origins of the hierarchical
feedforward model, its inability to explain various neurophysiological phenomena, and how feedback activity involving V1
took center stage in theories of awareness. Secondly, I will review the key evidence in favor of these views, as well as recent
results which have challenged them. Thirdly I will evaluate two key arguments of the feedback model: is blindsight a true
dissociation of awareness and visual detection? Are extrastriate responses relatively normal in the absence of V1, ruling out
an explanation in terms of impoverished extrastriate responses? Finally, I will offer an explanation of blindsight in terms of
‘‘local’’ computations and ‘‘global’’ inter-areal neural synchrony.
2. Hierarchical and feedback models of visual processing and awareness
2.1. The hierarchical view of visual awareness
Two characteristics of the visual cortex strongly contributed to the conventional view that visual information processing
giving rise to conscious perception is fundamentally hierarchical in nature (e.g. Crick & Koch, 1995). One of these is anatom-
ical hierarchy, based on the principle that connections between visual areas are normally reciprocal in nature, and that
within a reciprocal pair of connections, there are differences in the laminar distribution of cells of origin and axonal termi-
nation (Rockland & Pandya, 1979, 1981; Maunsell & Van Essen, 1983; Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). One type of projection
arises primarily from cells in supragranular layers, with a small contribution of 10–15% from infragranular layers, and ter-
minates in the granular layer; this type of pathway was named feedforward (or ascending) projection, and it provides the
excitatory drive of neuronal activity (e.g. Orban, 1984; Maunsell & Van Essen, 1987; Stone, Dreher, & Leventhal, 1979). A sec-
ond type of projection arises from cells in both supra-and infragranular layers and terminates most densely in layer I and/or
VI. This type of pathway was named the feedback or descending projection and it has a modulatory inﬂuence on the activity
induced by feedforward activity (e.g. Dreher, 1986; Van Essen & Maunsell, 1983). The model of cortical hierarchy was con-
structed such that each area was assigned just below the highest area to which it provides ascending input; visual areas shar-
ing intermediate projections were placed on the same level of the hierarchy. In this hierarchy (see Fig. 1), V1 is at the bottom,
and regions in the parietal, temporal and frontal regions at the top.
The second feature of the visual system contributing to the hierarchical view was functional specialization, which is a key
feature of the extrastriate cortex (Zeki, 1974, 1978). For example, nearly all neurons in the upper part of the posterior bank of
the superior temporal sulcus, now known as V5 or MT, respond to visual motion but not to other attributes such as wave-
length (Zeki, 1974), a ﬁnding later conﬁrmed by other studies (Albright, 1984; Van Essen, Maunsell, & Bixby, 1981). The
motion selectivity of V5/MT has also been demonstrated in the human visual cortex (Zeki et al., 1991). The existence of a
color-selective visual area, V4, has also been proposed (Zeki, 1973, 1977), although the precise location of a ‘‘color – center’’
in both the monkey and human cortex is still a matter of controversy (Heywood, Gadotti, & Cowey, 1992; Tootell, Nelissen,
Vanduffel, & Orban, 2004; Hadjikhani et al., 1998). At higher levels of the ventral cortical hierarchy, neurons display an even
higher level of specialization, for example, cells in the inferotemporal (IT) cortex are tuned to complex geometrical ﬁgures
(e.g. Tanaka, 1993) and faces (Perrett et al., 1982). In contrast, regions (such as V1 and V2) at the bottom of the cortical hier-
archy act as ﬁlters for a range of low-level stimulus attributes that fall within its receptive ﬁeld (e.g. Van Essen et al., 1992).
Anatomical hierarchy coupled with functional specialization contributed to the view that visual processing proceeds in a
feedforward fashion, with the role of lower-level areas such as V1 to merely provide input to regions at the top of the hier-
archy where high-level visual perception and awareness arise (Crick & Koch, 1995; Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). This was, to
an extent, consistent with Barlow’s (1972) view that ‘‘perception corresponds to the activity of a small selection from the
very numerous high-level neurons, each of which corresponds to a pattern of external events of the order of complexity
Fig. 1. Hierarchical organization of the monkey visual system (from Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). V1 is the lowest cortical level of the hierarchy,
extrastriate areas are at intermediate levels, and temporal, parietal and frontal regions at the highest level. This anatosmical hierarchy contributed to the
view that visual processing proceeds in a feedforward fashion, with the role of lower-level areas such as V1 to merely provide input to higher-level regions
where conscious experience arises.
J. Silvanto / Consciousness and Cognition 32 (2015) 15–32 17of the events symbolized by a word’’. In more moderate versions of this view, perception was proposed to arise from joint
activity of populations of high-level neurons in various regions in the visual cortex. For example, activation of neurons in the
face-selective regions in the IT cortex would give rise to face perception and motion awareness would result from activation
in the motion-selective area V5/MT (see e.g. microconsciousness theory by Zeki & Bartels, 1999).
2.2. Why anatomical hierarchy does not imply functional hierarchy: Problems with the hierarchical view of visual processing
Subsequently it became apparent that a strictly hierarchical model cannot account for a number of neurophysiological
phenomena. One prediction of the feedforward model is that response latencies of a given visual area can be predicted from
its level in the hierarchy; areas at high levels should have longer latencies than those at lower ones, as a result of the time
required for the transfer of information from one level to the next. However, a direct comparison between onset latencies of
single-unit responses between various levels of the hierarchy is inconsistent with this (Raiguel, Lagae, Gulyas, & Orban,
1989; Schmolesky et al., 1998). For instance, the frontal eye ﬁelds (FEF), placed at level 8 in the cortical hierarchy, exhibit
visual latencies comparable to those in level 2 (V2), level 3/4 (V3), level 5 (V5) and level 6 (MST). Furthermore, the latencies
in all of these areas were, on average, only 6–9 ms longer than the average V1 response. These results are in conﬂict with the
view that information ﬂow in the visual system proceeds in a strict feedforward fashion.
A second problem relates to the phenomenon that neuronal tuning evolves during the visually evoked response. A hier-
archical model would predict that the functional role of a lower-level area is concluded once it has fed information forward
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responses in V1 can be functionally distinct. In V1, 50 ms after the presentation of a textured ﬁgure overlying a textured
background, neurons show selectivity for the local orientation of the line segments that make up the ﬁgure; at 80 ms, the
ﬁgure ground boundary selectively evokes a larger response than the rest of the scene, and at 100 ms the elements of the
interior of the ﬁgure evoke a stronger response than the background elements (Lamme, 1995; Zipser et al., 1996). Impor-
tantly, it is this late stage of V1 activity that correlates with the monkey’s behavioral report, in terms of ﬁgure-ground seg-
regation being reﬂected in neural responses (Super, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2001). But in a strict feedforward model, these
‘‘late’’ responses would have no bearing on the information processing at higher levels, as they are not contained in the initial
feedforward sweep.
A third, and perhaps the most striking phenomenon inconsistent with hierarchical models, is that normal responsiveness
of neurons at the bottom of the cortical hierarchy (V1 and V2) is dependent on feedback from higher-level regions: inacti-
vation of V5/MT leads to a signiﬁcant decrease in neuronal responses in early visual areas, an effect present already in the
earliest stages of the V1 response (Hupe et al., 1998, 2001). Speciﬁcally, feedback has been found to facilitate evoked
responses to objects within the classical receptive ﬁeld as well as enhance suppression induced by background stimuli in
the surround. Thus feedback connections appear to act as a form of gain control of already active neurons (rather than a dri-
ver of otherwise silent neurons). Importantly, the effects were dependent on stimulus conditions, with strongest effects
found for low salience targets (Hupe et al., 1998). This result demonstrates that the cortical hierarchy acts in ‘‘reverse’’; ana-
tomically lower levels are reliant on input from higher levels for normal responsiveness.
2.3. Recurrent models of visual processing
These neurophysiological phenomena challenged the strictly hierarchical conceptualization of information processing in
the visual cortex and gave rise to various models emphasizing recurrent activity between visual areas. They appeared in the
context of prior theories which proposed recursive or adaptive resonance networks to link the visual system by means of a
series of ascending and descending pathways (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Milner, 1974; Grossberg, 1976; Edelman,
1978). The underlying principle of these models is that sensory data activate a feedback process wherein a learned template
modulates the sensory data until a consensus is reached between what the data are (provided by bottom-up, feedforward
input) and what we ‘‘expect’’ them to be (via top-down, feedback modulation) (Grossberg, 1976). The ﬁndings of Bullier’s
laboratory (Hupe et al., 1998, 2001) gave feedback models a strong neurophysiological foundation.
One of the models motivated by the new neurophysiological evidence was Bullier’s (2001) highly inﬂuential Integrated
Model of Visual Processing, which was not concerned with how conscious perception arises, but rather, attempted to explain
how information across the visual scene can be integrated so that ‘‘global’’ properties such as shadows and lighting artifacts
can be taken into account when the ‘‘local’’ aspects of the visual image are computed. In theory, this could be achieved with
local horizontal connections within a single cortical area. However, a V1 axon can reach a distance of only 0.6 degrees of
visual angle and as a result, transmission of information over a distance of one degree visual angle through horizontal con-
nections would take 100 ms. As 90 per cent of a neuron’s output is transmitted within the ﬁrst 100 ms of its response, it is
unlikely that the integration takes place through horizontal connections in V1 (Heller, Hertz, Kjaer, & Richmond, 1995). Due
to their larger receptive ﬁelds, areas higher up in the dorsal and ventral processing streams are more capable of integrating
information across long distances in the visual ﬁeld. However, as higher visual areas are also more selective, this integration
can only involve a particular stimulus attribute. In Bullier’s (2001) model, the problem of long-distance integration of various
stimulus parameters is solved by retroinjecting the global computations carried out by higher-level areas through feedback
connections into V1 and V2, where they guide the ﬁne-detail analysis. The convergent nature of feedback connections means
that they can carry information from long distances in the visual ﬁeld and are therefore perfectly suited for guiding the ﬁne-
detail analysis in V1 (Angelucci, Levitt, Walton, Hupe, & Bullier, 2002). Furthermore, as input from the magnocellular pro-
cessing stream reaches the visual cortex approximately 20 ms earlier than that conducted by the parvocellular stream
(Nowak, Munk, Girard, & Bullier, 1995; although smaller latency differences of no more than 10 ms have also been observed;
e.g. Maunsell et al., 1999), it is ideal for providing the initial global percept that guides parvocellular processing in V1.
2.4. Recurrent models of visual awareness
The ﬁrst theoretical framework proposing that reentry of information into lower-level visual areas is necessary for visual
awareness speciﬁcally was put forward by Pollen (1999). Pollen’s theory was an attempt to accommodate the ﬁndings that
while V1 appears to be indispensable to visual awareness, its activation is insufﬁcient to generate a percept if the integrity of
regions such as the parietal cortex is disrupted. This in Pollen’s (1999) model was accomplished through feedforward and
feedback pathways that link visual areas together into recursive loops. All visual areas in the ventral processing stream from
V1 through the inferotemporal cortex serve as possible substrates for different aspects of phenomenal visual experience. For
conscious perception to arise, a consensus needs to be reached between the visual areas that process the given stimulus; this
is achieved through feedforward and feedback pathways linking multiple cortical areas; conﬂicts of information prevent
conscious perception of that stimulus. Synchronous neuronal activity on a short timescale within and across cortical areas
may also serve as a marker that a ‘‘steady state’’ (or consensus) has been achieved, and is therefore a correlate of awareness.
In Pollen’s (1999) model, V1 and V2 provide respectively the ﬁne-grained and medium-grained representations in the
Fig. 2. In Lamme’s model (2001), conscious visual experience requires recurrent processing. Visual input reaches the early visual areas (V1) at 40 ms after
stimulus onset. Visual information is then rapidly fed forward to the extrastriate areas and parietal and temporal cortex (60 ms). This feedforward sweep of
information processing is unconscious. At around 100 ms, early visual areas and higher areas engage in recurrent interactions, which are necessary for
visual awareness. Speciﬁcally, extrastriate activation is fed back to V1 in order for that activation to be consciously perceived (from Lamme, 2001).
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visual world depend upon computations in V4 and the temporal lobe. Therefore, in this view the activity of which visual area
mostly correlates with a phenomenal experience depends on the features of the stimulus.
2.5. Why blindsight appears to implicate V1 in visual awareness
Blindsight has played a key role in the study of visual awareness because it appears to demonstrate a direct link between
V1 and conscious experience of visual qualia. Two lines of reasoning are central to this view. Firstly, the highly accurate
unconscious detection and discrimination performance in blindsight has been taken to indicate that V1 lesions selectively
impair conscious perception while leaving unconscious visual functions intact. The second argument involves the cortical
basis of blindsight. Residual unconscious vision in the absence of V1 could be explained in terms of subcortical regions which
continue to process visual information; and as visual awareness is often attributed to cortical activity, the unconscious
nature of these visual functions would not be surprising. However, this possibility is ruled out by demonstrations of subcor-
tical pathways which can activate extrastriate areas in the absence of V1 (e.g. Rodman et al., 1989a, 1989b; Cowey & Stoerig,
1989; Goebel et al., 2001; Schmid et al., 2010) and by brain stimulation evidence indicating that these extrastriate activa-
tions are necessary for blindsight (Alexander & Cowey, 2009). Thus in the absence of V1, the argument goes, extrastriate
regions can be activated and this activation can guide visual functions but not reach conscious experience. These two
arguments are paramount: if extrastriate neural responses were severely impoverished by the V1 lesion and only few
low-level visual functions survived, it would be more parsimonious to attribute the loss of awareness to reduced functioning
of the extrastriate visual cortex.
The dissociation between conscious and unconscious visual processing, together with demonstrations of the cortical basis
of blindsight, gave rise to the view that conscious experience of all visual attributes relies on V1 and that all extrastriate acti-
vation needs to be fed back to V1 in order for its content to be consciously perceived. This possibility has been speculated by
various researchers (e.g. Stoerig & Cowey, 1995; Weiskrantz, 1997), but it was formalized in Lamme’s (2001) inﬂuential
model linking V1, feedback and visual awareness. Its main premise is that unconscious visuo-motor transformations (as
in blindsight) may be executed in an entirely feedforward processing cycle, while visual awareness is critically dependent
on feedback connections to V1 (see Fig. 2; see also Block, 2005). As soon as a region has been activated by the feedforward
sweep, recurrent interactions between neurons within that area and neurons that have been activated earlier at lower levels
can begin. These interactions are mediated by horizontal connections and feedforward/feedback circuits between and within
areas. They are expressed in neuronal responses as modulatory inﬂuences from beyond the classical, feedforward, receptive
ﬁeld (Albright & Stoner, 2002; Lamme & Spekreijse, 2000).2
3. Key evidence on the importance of extrastriate-V1 feedback in visual awareness
3.1. Evidence consistent with the feedback model
Much of the subsequent key evidence on the role of feedback activity in visual awareness has come from studies employ-
ing transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). TMS has a number of properties that makes it an ideal tool for testing feedback
models (see e.g. Sandrini, Umiltà, & Rusconi, 2011; Silvanto, 2013; Van de Ven & Sack, 2013; Walsh & Pascual-Leone, 2003).
Firstly, it can assess the necessity of cortical regions in perceptual functions with millisecond precision and a spatial
resolution of approximately one centimeter3 (e.g. Amassian et al., 1989). Secondly, because the neural activity induced by
TMS spreads to anatomically connected regions (e.g. Ilmoniemi et al., 1997), corticocortical information ﬂow can be traced.
Thirdly, TMS can directly activate regions that are no longer receiving feedforward input due to a lesion lower down in the
visual system. In some cases, it may be difﬁcult to determine whether loss of functionality in a given brain area is due to local2 However, why this modulation should be the hallmark of visual awareness has not been explicitly addressed.
3 In contrast, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) cannot directly assess feedback activity due to its slow temporal resolution, while the low spatial
resolution of electroencephalography precludes strong conclusions regarding the cortical regions involved (see e.g. Tong, 2003 for fMRI evidence on the role of
V1 in awareness). This review focuses on TMS studies as they form the backbone of the empirical evidence.
Fig. 3. Demonstration of the importance of extrastriate-V1 feedback in phosphene perception in neurologically normal observers (Pascual-Leone & Walsh,
2001). Subthreshold TMS applied over V1 before stimulation of V5/MT has no effect on the percepts induced by V5 TMS. But when the V1 TMS pulse follows
the V5/MT stimulation, phosphene perception is impaired. The timing of these effects supports the view that feedback to V1 is necessary for the V5/MT
activation to be consciously perceived (ﬁgure adapted from Juan et al., 2004).
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TMS can be used directly to stimulate speciﬁc areas to test their functionality. This approach was used by Cowey and Walsh
(2000), who applied TMS over presumably intact extrastriate visual areas such as V5/MT in the blindsight subject GY in order
to test the ability of these regions to generate phosphenes (perception of ﬂashes of light that can be induced by direct stimu-
lation of the visual cortex) in the absence of V1. GY suffered almost total destruction of his left V1, resulting in complete blind-
ness in the right visual ﬁeld with the exception of some macular sparing (Azzopardi & Cowey, 2001). He was able to perceive
phosphenes induced from the normal, right, hemisphere. But stimulation of intact extrastriate regions in the damaged hemi-
sphere did not generate phosphenes, indicating that these areas cannot generate conscious percepts in the absence of V1 in
the same hemisphere. (This conclusion assumes that the extrastriate neurons can be sufﬁciently activated in the absence of
V1; as will be discussed in the last section, this may not be the case.)
Thus the early TMS evidence from blindsight was consistent with the view that activity in the extrastriate cortex needs to
be fed back to V1 in order to be perceived consciously. If these feedback signals are disrupted, visual awareness of extras-
triate activation cannot arise. Pascual-Leone and Walsh (2001) tested this hypothesis in neurologically normal observers
by inducing phosphenes from V5/MT with suprathreshold TMS, and applying another TMS pulse over V1,4 below phosphene
threshold, at various stimulation-onset asynchronies (see Fig. 3). The logic was that, if V5/MT activity needs to be fed back to V1
in order to reach awareness, then the disruption of this feedback by the application of TMS over V1 should prevent the content
of this activation from being consciously perceived. The results showed that when the V1 stimulation postdated the V5/MT
pulse by 10–40 ms, phosphene motion was degraded. In contrast, when the V1 TMS pulse preceded the V5/MT stimulation,
phosphene appearance was unaffected. From the temporal speciﬁcity of V1 involvement in the perception of V5/MT phosphenes
it was inferred that extrastriate activation reaches awareness via V1.4 While selective stimulation of V1 by TMS is unlikely to be possible as the application of TMS over the occipital pole also affects regions such as V2 and V3
(Salminen-Vaparanta, Koivisto, Noreika, Vanni, & Revonsuo, 2012; Thielscher, Reichenbach, Ug˘urbil, & Uludag˘, 2010), neuropsychological evidence suggest that
the suppressive effects of TMS in many visual tasks are most likely to reﬂect the disruption of V1 (see Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001), as lesions to areas such as
V2 have more subtle perceptual consequences (e.g. Merigan et al., 1993).
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the activation level of V1 that determines whether V5/MT activation reaches awareness. Speciﬁcally, it was shown that par-
ticipants perceived features (motion and shape) of their V5/MT phosphene even when V5/MT was stimulated at a subthresh-
old intensity, if this stimulation was followed 10–50 ms later a by V1 suprathreshold pulse (Silvanto, Cowey, Lavie, & Walsh,
2005). In contrast, when both sites were stimulated at subthreshold level, no phosphenes were perceived. Taken together
with the ﬁndings of Pascual-Leone andWalsh (2001), this result suggested that the activation level of V5/MT does not deter-
mine whether motion is perceived; even though V5/MT inﬂuences information content in V1 via feedback connections, it is
V1 activity level which determines whether that activation reaches awareness.
The importance of V5/MT-V1 feedback in visual awareness was also demonstrated in conscious perception of visually
presented motion. In a study by Silvanto, Lavie, and Walsh (2005), TMS was administered over V1/V2 or V5/MT in different
time windows during the performance of a motion detection task. The results showed two critical periods of V1 activity, one
‘‘early’’ window approximately 40 ms after stimulus offset and another ‘‘late’’ period at 80 ms after stimulus offset. Interest-
ingly, the critical time window of V5/MT activity fell between the early and late V1/V2 time windows. This pattern of result
suggested that V5/MT obtains visual information through V1 feedforward activity (reﬂected in the V5/MT critical time win-
dow postdating the early V1/V2 effect), after which the information is fed back from V5/MT to V1 (reﬂected in the ‘‘late’’ V1
critical period postdating the V5/MT critical time window). The ‘‘late’’ V1 activity in response to this feedback would underlie
visual awareness.3.2. Feedback to V1: critical for conscious perception per se or visual processing in general?
Although the above as well as numerous subsequent studies (e.g. Camprodon, Zohary, Brodbeck, & Pascual-Leone, 2010;
Heinen, Jolij, & Lamme, 2005; Laycock, Crewther, Fitzgerald, & Crewther, 2007) supported the view that feedback activity
plays an important role in visual perception, it was not clear whether this activity was unique to conscious perception or
rather a general feature of visual cortical information processing. This issue has been examined in a number of studies.
Koivisto, Mantyla, and Silvanto (2010) used TMS to investigate the necessity of the ‘‘late’’ V1 activity for both conscious
and unconscious visual perception, through the use of both subjective and objective measures of motion perception on each
trial. Speciﬁcally, participants were asked to provide a rating of their subjective perceptual experience of visually presented
motion and in addition to perform a forced-choice direction discrimination task on the same stimuli. If the ‘‘late’’ period of
V1 activity is unique to visual awareness, the application of TMS during this stage should weaken subjective experience of
motion but leave forced-choice discrimination performance on unaware trials unaffected. In contrast, if the ‘‘late’’ V1 activity
reﬂects a general principle of visual cortical information processing, TMS should disrupt performance in both cases. The
results showed that both aware and unaware motion perception were impaired by TMS at the ‘‘late’’ time window: there
was a signiﬁcant reduction in both the strength of subjective experience of motion and the discrimination performance
on unaware trials. Thus the ‘‘late’’ period of V1 activity in response to extrastriate feedback appears to be necessary for both
aware and unaware visual perception.
This result seems inconsistent with the ﬁndings that blindsight patients can detect motion, as in such patients feedback to
V1 cannot occur. One possible explanation is that in the study of Koivisto et al. (2010), V1 feedback was necessary because
the motion was across very small distances; the target stimulus appeared within an imaginary square subtending 0.7  0.7
degrees of visual angle and the dots moved only pixel per frame. With such small-scale motion stimuli, the small V1 recep-
tive ﬁelds might be needed for encoding the stimulus, and this could be accomplished by the engagement of V5/MT-V1 feed-
back connections (Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002). Indeed, as will be discussed in Section 4.1, detection of ﬁne details is absent in
blindsight.
Subsequent studies have been consistent with this result (e.g. de Graaf, Cornelsen, Jacobs, & Sack, 2011; Jacobs, de Graaf,
Goebel, & Sack, 2012; Koivisto, Railo, Revonsuo, Vanni, & Salminen-Vaparanta, 2011). Jacobs et al. (2012) compared the crit-
ical time windows of V1 activity in behavioral priming and visual awareness. The behavioral impact of a prime can be inde-
pendent from its conscious experience, suggesting two independent neural signatures. However, TMS revealed no time
window at which TMS selectively affected visual awareness, indicating that this dissociation is not manifested in the timing
of V1 involvement. One study by Koivisto et al. (2011) did ﬁnd a weak dissociation between the effects of TMS on subjective
awareness and forced-choice discrimination in a task involving the detection of the orientation of an arrow. Whereas sub-
jective awareness was impaired by TMS at time windows ranging from 60 ms to 120 ms from stimulus onset, the forced-
choice task was not signiﬁcantly affected beyond 90 ms, indicating that the critical time window of awareness extended
beyond that of the forced-choice task. However, the TMS effects on both awareness and accuracy peaked at 90 ms, and
the dissociation may have been due to different susceptibilities of the two tasks to TMS-induced disruption. Indeed, the tem-
poral proﬁle of the TMS effect was very similar for the two judgments. Furthermore, the dissociation was found for only one
stimulus type, indicating that the effect is not generalizable across stimulus categories.
In addition to V1, its neighboring region V2 has also been implicated in visual awareness (Salminen-Vaparanta, 2012). But
as no dissociation between forced-choice performance and subjective awareness ratings was found, this result can also be
explained in terms of V2 being involved in low-level, pre-conscious processes, the disruption of which will prevent the target
stimulus from reaching phenomenal awareness. With respect to V2, it is also worth noting that its role in awareness is not
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mental effect on phenomenal awareness as a V1 lesion (Merigan et al., 1993).
3.3. TMS-induced blindsight: evidence of conscious effects in V1 or merely of response bias?
Although both conscious and unconscious performance are impaired by V1 TMS at similar time windows, subjective Yes–
No judgments of stimulus presence have been found to be more strongly affected than forced-choice discrimination perfor-
mance (Boyer, Harrison, & Ro, 2005; Christensen, Kristiansen, Rowe, & Nielsen, 2008; Jolij & Lamme, 2005; Ro, Shelton, Lee, &
Chang, 2004). Moreover, forced-choice accuracy has been found to remain above chance on trials in which participants
report not having consciously seen the stimulus. This phenomenon is referred to as TMS-induced blindsight, because it
appears to mirror the dissociation between objective and subjective measures of performance found in patients with V1
lesions. The problem with these studies is that participants’ judgments in the Yes–No detection task depends partly on their
bias, independently of sensitivity, to report the stimulus as being present or absent. Participants may have different criteria
for deciding target presence, and under- or over-conﬁdence will strongly affect the accuracy of forced-choice performance
(e.g. left vs. right discrimination) on trials on which participants responded not having perceived the target in the Yes–No
task. This issue can be overcome with the use of signal-detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966) in which the measure of sen-
sitivity, d prime (d0), is independent of bias. A key ﬁnding in blindsight subject GY is that his receiver operator characteristic
curves (ROCs) qualitatively differ from those of normal participants. Speciﬁcally, using SDT analyses, Azzopardi and Cowey
(1997) showed that the blindsight subject GY was approximately half as sensitive to targets during the Yes–No task as during
the forced-choice task. This difference was not statistically signiﬁcant in the healthy controls. However, in TMS-induced
blindsight, when signal-detection analysis is carried out, there is no longer evidence of unconscious stimulus detection or
discrimination (Lloyd, Abrahamyan, & Harris, 2013), with the exception of affective information (Jolij & Lamme, 2005). In
short, TMS-induced blindsight does not appear to be a robust phenomenon and therefore does not offer support for the view
that V1 is uniquely involved in conscious perception.
In conclusion, while numerous TMS studies are certainly consistent with the view that feedback processes contribute to
conscious experience, they fall short of demonstrating the existence of mechanisms unique to visual awareness. Thus while
feedback processes are certainly important for visual perception, it does not seem parsimonious to attribute them exclu-
sively to conscious experience (see e.g. Lau, 2008). It is also important to note the electrophysiological evidence indicating
that the importance of extrastriate-V1 feedback is stimulus-dependent (Hupe et al., 1998), which would not be the case if
they were the hallmark of all awareness. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the contribution of TMS to the under-
standing of feedback processes in the human cortex. Since the pioneering studies of Cowey and Walsh (2000) and Pascual-
Leone and Walsh (2001), much has been learnt about the information ﬂow in the visual cortex and cortico-cortical interac-
tions with this technique.
3.4. Conscious perception of visually presented information in the absence of V1
Theories linking V1 feedback with visual awareness rely strongly on the neuropsychological evidence of ﬁeld defects
being absolute. In contradiction with this, there have been claims that blindsight subjects are consciously aware of motion
in their blind ﬁeld (e.g. Barbur, Watson, Frackowiak, & Zeki, 1993; ffytche, Guy, & Zeki, 1996; ffytche & Zeki, 2011). Some of
this evidence involves patients in whom the absence of V1 has not been veriﬁed using both anatomical and functional MRI,
and paradigms in which eye movements were not controlled for (e.g. Ffytche & Zeki, 2011). However, such claims have also
been made in relation to the blindsight subject GY, in whom no doubt exists as to the complete lack of V1 functionality (e.g.
Goebel et al., 2001). Speciﬁcally, it was claimed that GY ‘‘. . .was able to discriminate correctly and faultlessly and to have
conscious awareness of having seen the particular visual stimulus’’ (Barbur et al., 1993). GY himself denies having phenom-
enal visual experience in his blind ﬁeld. In an interview with Weiskrantz (1997), he described his blind ﬁeld experience as
follows: ‘‘you don’t actually ever sense anything or see anything. . .its more an awareness but you don’t see it. . ..it is a sense
that I haven’t got. . ..if you said something to try to describe sight to a blind man, we don’t have the words to do it because he
does not have the receptors or the reception, and that is the same with me. I mean I can’t describe something I don’t under-
stand myself’’. From this it appears that GY can have a nonvisual sense of events occurring in it; however, this ‘‘awareness’’
does not appear to be phenomenal in nature.
There are, however, circumstances in which patients without V1 can clearly experience visual qualia in their blind ﬁeld. In
hemianopic completion, which can occur when visual stimuli are presented across the vertical meridian such that one half of
the ﬁgure falls within the blind hemiﬁeld, some patients are able to perceive the complete ﬁgure (e.g., Bender & Kahn, 1949).
For example, in a study by Marcel (1998), when both the normal and the blind hemiﬁeld of patients were stimulated in com-
bination, such that the stimulus formed a good Gestalt, a visual after-image appeared in both hemiﬁelds (see Fig. 4). In con-
trast, when the blind ﬁeld was stimulated in isolation, no afterimage was perceived. Hemianopic completion has been
associated with activation anterior to retinotopic cortex in the lingual gyrus in the right occipital cortex, contralateral to
the lesion, ipsilateral to the illusory edge of the stimulus (Weil, Plant, James-Galton, & Rees, 2009). Further but less system-
atically investigated examples of phenomenal conscious experience in hemianopia include hallucinations, which can occur
especially in the early stages of recovery from stroke (Kölmel, 1985; see also Silvanto & Rees, 2011, for a review).
Fig. 4. Hemianopic completion in blindsight (from Marcel, 1998). On the left, stimuli used to induce after-image, and on the right, the most frequent
drawing out of three series made by each subject to depict what they had seen. In certain conditions, the blindsight participants perceived afterimages in
their blind ﬁeld.
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Fig. 5. Phosphene appearance in GY, based on his drawings (from Silvanto et al., 2008). (A) Unilateral stimulation of V5/MT in the normal hemisphere
induced a contralateral moving phosphene in the intact visual ﬁeld. (B) Bilateral stimulation of GY’s V5/MT induced bilateral phosphenes.
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There is also evidence of TMS-induced percepts in blindsight patients. As discussed above, the application of TMS over the
ipsilesional extrastriate cortex of the blindsight subject GY does not induce the experience of phosphenes in the blind ﬁeld
(Cowey & Walsh, 2000), consistent with the view that extrastriate activation cannot reach awareness in the absence of ipsi-
lateral V1. However, subsequently it was shown that his ipsilesional activation can reach awareness under speciﬁc circum-
stances. GY could perceive a phosphene intruding into both the intact and the blind visual ﬁeld when TMS was applied over
V5/MT bilaterally (Silvanto, Cowey, Lavie, & Walsh, 2007; see Fig. 5). Two characteristics of GY’s blind ﬁeld phosphenes sug-
gested that a percept in the intact visual ﬁeld was necessary for their induction. Firstly, GY did not consistently perceive
phosphenes that were restricted to his blind ﬁeld, and secondly, when the intact hemisphere was stimulated below phos-
phene threshold, no phosphenes were induced, indicating that the activity level of the intact hemisphere determined phos-
phene presence.
This ﬁnding was not restricted to achromatic pecepts, as in a subsequent study, by combining bilateral application of TMS
with a chromatic adaptation paradigm (Silvanto, Muggleton, Cowey, & Walsh, 2007), it was shown that GY can also perceive
chromatic color in his blind ﬁeld (Silvanto, Cowey, & Walsh, 2008). In this study, GY was adapted to color displays prior to
phopshene induction. Without adaptation, unilateral stimulation of V5/MT in GY’s intact hemisphere induced a moving
phosphene similar to those reported by normal subjects, whereas unilateral stimulation of the ipsilesional V5/MT never
induced a phosphene. After adaptation, phosphenes induced with unilateral TMS in the control subjects as well as from
GY’s intact hemisphere appeared in the color of the adapting stimulus (see Cattaneo, Devlin, Salvini, Vecchi, & Silvanto,
2010; Cattaneo, Rota, Walsh, Vecchi, & Silvanto, 2009; Silvanto & Muggleton, 2008; Guzmán-López, Silvanto, & Yousif,
et al., 2011, Guzmán-López, Silvanto, & Seemungal, 2011 for examples of state-dependent TMS approach). In control sub-
jects, when TMS was applied over both hemispheres to induce a biltateral phosphene, the component of the phosphene over-
lapping the adapted hemiﬁeld appeared colored, and the component overlapping the unadapted hemiﬁeld was lacking in
chromatic color. In contrast, in GY the bilateral phosphene appeared uniformly colored after adaptation was restricted to
the intact ﬁeld. Furthermore, when adaptation was restricted to GY’s blind ﬁeld, the phosphene always appeared colorless.
As adaptation of the blind ﬁeld had no inﬂuence on phosphene color, it must have been adaptation of the wavelength/color-
selective regions in GY’s normal hemisphere that enabled color experience in the blind ﬁeld. These TMS ﬁndings may be
related to hemianopic completion, in which the contralesional extrastriate cortex has been implicated (Weil et al., 2009).
GY’s blind ﬁeld phosphenes may possibly result from the spread of ipsilesional activation to the contralesional V5/MT
through callosal connections, thereby increasing and/or modulating the activation level of neurons in V5/MT of the normal
hemisphere that have a representation of the ipsilateral visual ﬁeld. The existence of callosal pathways in GY has been dem-
onstrated using probabilistic diffusion-based tractography (Bridge et al., 2008). This study also revealed that GY possesses a
prominent novel pathway between the LGN in the intact hemisphere and V5/MT in the damaged hemisphere. This could
account for the ﬁnding that when TMS is applied over V5/MT of the damaged hemisphere, it inﬂuences the appearance of
phosphenes evoked by TMS applied above V1 of the normal hemisphere, an effect not found in controls (Silvanto, Walsh,
& Cowey, 2009). The existence of such abnormal connections warrants caution when drawing conclusion regarding the neu-
ral basis of visual awareness in the normal brain. While conscious perception is possible in GY, the implications to under-
standing visual awareness in the normal brain may be limited.
Intriguingly, a very recent study has demonstrated that even unilateral application of TMS over intact regions of the
damaged hemisphere can induce phosphenes in the absence of V1. In a study by Mazzi et al. (submitted for publication),
the authors attempted to induce phosphenes by applying TMS over the parietal cortex of the lesioned hemisphere in two
hemianopic patients with a complete destruction of V1. Importantly, both patients could perceive phosphenes with this
stimulation (see Fig. 6), and a psychophysical threshold function on these phosphenes could be created, which was not
Fig. 6. Phosphenes induced in two patients with V1 lesions (from Mazzi et al., submitted for publication), at two different TMS intensities (55% and 95% of
TMS output).
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from the ipsilesional hemisphere, with properties similar to those induced in neurologically normal observers. This is a novel
result with important theoretical implications, and does not suffer from at least two limitations present in the ﬁndings of
Silvanto et al. (2007, 2008). Firstly, the induction of a phosphene from patients’ normal hemisphere was not required for
the blind ﬁeld phosphene to arise; thus, unlike the phosphenes experienced by GY, they cannot be exclusively explained
in terms of blind ﬁeld percepts being experienced through activation reaching awareness in the normal hemisphere. Sec-
ondly, unlike GY (who sustained his injury at the age of 8 and participated in the phosphene studies decades later), both
of these patients sustained their injuries in adulthood, and the TMS studies were carried out relatively soon (6 and
30 months) after the neurological event. It is thus unlikely that novel and abnormal connectivity underlies their phosphene
perception in these patients.
The key implication of these studies is that feedback to ipsilateral V1 does not seem to be the only pathway for extras-
triate activation to reach awareness. One could argue that it is V1 in the intact hemisphere which enabled conscious expe-
rience to arise. However, as V1 contains a representation of only the contralateral visual ﬁeld, activity of the intact V1 cannot
underlie the blind ﬁeld percepts. Furthermore, it is not a parsimonious explanation of the ﬁndings of Mazzi et al. (submitted
for publication) where there is no evidence of the necessity of the intact hemisphere.
Overall, the evidence reviewed in Section 3 suggests the following. Firstly, while extrastriate-V1 feedback appears to play
an important in visual perception, it does not seem to be uniquely associated with awareness. This is consistent with elec-
trophysiological evidence indicating that the importance of extrastriate feedback on V1 activity is stimulus-dependent
(Hupe et al., 1998), which would not be the case if they were required for all awareness. Secondly, demonstrations of con-
scious experience in the absence of V1 argue against the possibility that this region is the only gateway to awareness.
4. Theoretical implications of blindsight: evaluating the key arguments
As discussed in Section 2, theories linking V1 feedback with visual awareness rely on two main tenets deriving from
blindsight. Firstly, the highly accurate detection performance in the absence of awareness has been interpreted as a selective
effect of V1 damage on visual awareness. Secondly, it is argued that the loss of awareness cannot simply be due to a loss of
extrastriate functioning, as extrastriate regions retain a relatively normal responsiveness in the absence of V1. These argu-
ments are of great theoretical importance: if extrastriate neural responses were severely impoverished by the V1 lesion and
only few visual functions survived, it would be more parsimonious to attribute the loss of awareness to reduced functioning
of the extrastriate visual cortex, resulting from the loss of excitatory feedforward input from V1. The few residual visual
functions could be explained in terms awareness being more vulnerable to disruption. These arguments will be evaluated
next.
4.1. Is blindsight a true dissociation of awareness and visual detection?
It is often stated that V1 lesions abolish conscious perception selectively; a wide range of visual functions remain even
though phenomenological experience is lost fully. However, this is an oversimpliﬁcation, as the visual functions that survive
V1 lesions are severely impoverished (see Cowey, 2004, for review). Human blindsight subjects are unable to discriminate
gratings when luminance contrast is reduced to 0.1 Michelson contrast, even when tested at most effective spatial frequen-
cies at which performance of control participants is at ceiling. Orientation discrimination is no more than about 10 degrees
(Morland, Ogilvie, Ruddock, & Wright, 1996; Weiskrantz, 1986), and wavelength discrimination is increased by tenfold
(Stoerig & Cowey, 1992). Many visual functions such as shape discrimination are absent in blindsight subjects. Even true
motion perception is not preserved (Azzopardi & Cowey, 2001); although blindsight subjects can discriminate the direction
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detected the presence of the bar in a given position, and shortly afterwards in another position. With global motion stimuli,
in which the moving dots are randomly regenerated from moment to moment but have an overall vector motion, this is not
possible. Blindsight subjects (including GY) fail to discriminate the direction of such motion stimuli (Azzopardi & Cowey,
2001); thus blindsight is motion-blind.
The residual visual functions are in fact so poor that a seeing person with such acuity would be legally classiﬁed as blind
(Cowey, 2004). Strictly speaking, therefore, blindsight is not a dissociation of conscious perception and visual detection;
rather it is a case of severely impoverished residual visual function in the absence of visual awareness. This is a neglected
issue but an important one, because the lack of an absolute dissociation between conscious and unconscious visual functions
could be explained in terms of conscious perception merely being more susceptible to disruption than low-level detection
and discrimination.
Nevertheless, blindsight is unlike near-threshold vision in that its hallmark is a robust dissociation between performance
in Yes–No tasks assessing conscious experience and forced-choice detection tasks which is absent in healthy controls
(Azzopardi & Cowey 1997). As discussed in Section 3, when assessed through SDT analyses, the blindsight subject GY is
approximately half as sensitive to targets during the Yes–No task as during the forced-choice task, a difference not found
in the healthy controls (Azzopardi & Cowey 1997). While the range of stimuli with which this dissociation occurs is limited,
the question of why it happens at all remains; why is blindsight blind? Section 5 will attempt to resolve this issue.
4.2. Neural responsiveness of the visual cortex in the absence of V1
It is often argued that the loss of awareness in blindsight cannot simply be due to lack of excitatory input from V1, as
extrastriate regions can be activated in the absence of V1. What is the effect of a V1 lesion on neuronal responses in the
ipsilesional extrastriate cortex? Initial electrophysiological evidence suggested that extrastriate regions V2, V3 and V4 are
silenced while dorsal stream areas V5/MT and V3a remain responsive (e.g. Schiller & Malpeli, 1977; Rodman et al.,
1989a; Girard & Bullier, 1989; Girard et al., 1991). However, subsequent fMRI and electrophysiological studies carried out
in macaques have shown that also V2, V3, V4, superior temporal sulcus and lateral intraparietal area show residual respon-
siveness in the absence of V1 (Schmid et al., 2009, 2010); the discprecancy with earlier studies might be due to the former
assessing V2 and V3 functionality using cooling (Girard & Bullier, 1989; Girard et al., 1991), rather than surgical lesions (see
Schmid et al., 2009 for detailed discussion on the source of this discrepancy). The neural responses in V5/MT have been stud-
ied in most detail and thus offer the most detailed clues on how extrastriate neurons can function in the absence of V1.
Rodman et al. (1989a) presented bars moving through the receptive ﬁelds of V5/MT neurons in macaques after unilateral
removal of V1. Evoked responses of neurons with receptive ﬁelds within the lesion zone were weak; while 66% of the neu-
rons were still responsive, only 5% gave responses classiﬁed as strong. Whereas average response magnitude of V5/MT in an
unlesioned monkey is approximately 19 spikes per second, in the lesion zone the responses of the majority of neurons were
less than half of this (Rodman et al., 1989a). Single units within the lesion zone also tended to exhibit abnormally bursty
spontaneous activity and high response variability. While the briskness of the responses was lost, direction selectivity
was present, and tuning sharpness was within parameters reported to be within the normal range. This residual activation
is likely to be driven by inputs from superior colliculus, as its lesion silenced V5/MT completely (Rodman et al., 1989b).
Intriguingly, none of the cells with receptive ﬁelds outside of the lesion zone had response magnitudes as high as the highest
values found in unlesioned monkeys. This might be due to the loss of local excitatory connections from cells in the lesion
zone, pointing to a general loss of excitation after a V1 lesion.
Rosa et al. (2000) investigated the residual responses in the middle temporal region of marmoset monkeys. 17 of the 36
cells with receptive ﬁelds inside the scotoma showed no signiﬁcant response to stimulation of the visual ﬁeld inside the sco-
toma; 13 cells did so, and also showed evidence of direction selectivity. In contrast, another study on marmoset monkeys
found no signiﬁcant residual responses after a V1 lesion (Collins et al., 2003). The latter study investigated neuronal
responses immediately after a V1 lesion, whereas post-lesion recovery period in the study by Rosa et al. (2000) was 4–
6 weeks.
Azzopardi, Fallah, Gross, and Rodman (2003) examined the temporal dimension of the residual activity by measuring V5/
MT responses in four macaques after unilateral V1 removal. Global motion stimuli were used. In the damaged hemisphere,
V5/MT responses were consistently much weaker, irrespective of the speed of the stimulus or whether or not the stimulus
was positioned mainly inside, or mainly outside the blind ﬁeld. While every recorded neuron responded signiﬁcantly to
visual stimulation, on average neurons were only as responsive to moving stimuli as V5/MT neurons in unlesioned monkeys
to the presentation of a non-moving bar. In the unlesioned hemisphere, median response latencies to stimuli moving at 4
and 20 degrees per second were 78 ms and 83 ms, respectively. In V5/MT ipsilateral to a striate cortex lesion, these latencies
were longer by an average difference of between 30 and 320 ms, These abnormally long response latencies were not merely
associated with slow moving stimuli to which V5/MT responses are weaker but were also found with fast motion. Therefore,
the long latencies were not merely a consequence of low response magnitude (cf. Raiguel et al., 1999).
Thus the existing evidence does not support the view that extrastriate activity can be rather normal in the absence of V1.
In V5/MT, neurons show abnormally bursty spontaneous activity and high response variability, and the normally brisk
evoked responses are replaced by sluggish long-latency neural ﬁring. Importantly, direction selectivity does remain, and
can be within normal range. While the functionality of other extrastriate regions has been less studied, there is evidence that
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tiunit activity) in V2, V3, V4 to stimuli in the blind ﬁeld are approximately 20–30% of pre-lesion levels (Schmid et al., 2009,
2010, 2013).
In summary, blindsight is not a pure dissociation of conscious perception and visual detection; rather it is a case of
severely impoverished residual visual function in the absence of visual awareness. Furthermore, while extrastriate neurons
retain certain levels of neural tuning in the absence of V1, their responses are reduced. Thus the two main tenets of the view
linking V1 to visual awareness do not hold; V1 lesions do not induce a selective effect on visual awareness, and extrastriate
activity is not normal in the absence of V1.5. Emerging view: Explaining blindsight in terms of a distinction between ‘‘local’’ vs ‘‘global’’ visual functions
Existing literature does not support the view that awareness arises in V1 in response to feedback from extrastriate cortex.
Nevertheless, important questions remain: why is blindsight blind? Why is awareness lost after a V1 lesion, and why are the
diminished V5/MT responses able to give rise to visual detection in the absence of awareness? An explanation is offered here
between two types of visual processes: those that can be accomplished ‘‘locally’’ within a single cortical region, and those of
‘‘global’’ nature, deﬁned by inter-areal communication. It is proposed that the former are possible in blindsight. The latter, of
which consciousness is one, cannot occur due to the loss of recurrent activity involving V1.
5.1. ‘‘Local’’ vs. ‘‘global’’ neural computations and visual functions
A ‘‘local’’ visual function, as deﬁned here, is one for which the key neural process takes place within one cortical area. Of
course, all brain regions are dependent on regions lower down in the anatomical hierarchy for input to drive their neural
activity; for this reason a visual function cannot, strictly speaking, be exclusively ‘‘local’’. However, the point is that the
key neural computation underlying the visual function is limited to one brain region. In the case of a ‘‘local’’ visual function,
it is the readout from neural ﬁring rates in response to an external stimulus which guides behavior. While it is challenging to
make a direct link between neural activity and behavioral output, a number of criteria have been put forward (e.g. Parker &
Newsome, 1998). Fundamentally, it is important that the neural activity not only correlates with perceptual reports indepen-
dently of the motor response, but that manipulation of that activity has a corresponding effect on those reports.
A good example of a ‘‘local’’ function is motion detection in V5/MT. The ratio of spiking activity between V5/MT neurons
of different direction tunings has been shown to predict behavioral responses in monkeys in motion detection tasks (e.g.
Adelson & Movshon, 1982). In neural readout models, each V5/MT neuron is thought of as having a vote for the vector of
its preferred tuning, with the strength of its vote being proportional to its ﬁring rate (e.g. Groh, Born, & Newsome, 1997).
For example, in the vector average model, the preferred tunings are averaged together in proportion to the ﬁring rate of each
neuron, whereas in the ‘‘winner-take-all’’ model, the winner is the single vector receiving the most votes. It has been shown
that in V5/MT, neurons with nearly opposite preferred directions compete in a manner consistent with a ‘‘winner-take-all’’
model, whereas a coding scheme resembling vector averaging is used for neurons with less extreme differences in preferred
direction tunings (Nichols & Newsome, 2002). Furthermore, microstimulation of V5/MT neurons biases motion judgments
towards the direction of the stimulated neuron, demonstrating the causal link between the neural activity and observer’s
judgments (Groh et al., 1997; Nichols & Newsome, 2002). The key point is that once information reaches V5/MT, it is the
ﬁring rate of neurons in this region that determines the behavioral consequence of the stimulus. It is a local computation
which underlies the behavioral output.
While detection of simple visual features such as motion, orientation and brightness can be accomplished locally, more
complex visual tasks requiring the binding of stimulus features, semantic processing and working memory are likely to addi-
tionally require coordination between numerous brain areas, as they cannot be fully encoded by any one visual region. For
such ‘‘global’’ visual functions, the key neural signature is inter-areal communication which may be accomplished through
oscillatory activity.5 The foundation for such communication is that activated neuronal populations have the intrinsic property
to oscillate, which gives rise to rhythmic modulations in neuronal excitability affecting both the sensitivity to synaptic input
and likelihood of spike output (Fries, 2005). According to one inﬂuential model (Fries, 2005), only coherently oscillating neu-
ronal groups can communicate effectively, because their communication windows for input and for output are open at the same
time. Long-range inter-areal oscillatory synchrony is characterized by phase synchronization and thought to arise via feedfor-
ward and feedback connections (Lachaux et al., 2000). A good example of a ‘‘global’’ visual function is binding, which requires
inter-areal communication because different features of the object (e.g. color, shape, motion) are analyzed by different extras-
triate regions. The outcome of those separate analyses has been proposed to be combined via neuronal synchrony (Singer &
Gray, 1995), such that all neurons in different visual areas that are involved in the processing of a given object synchronize their
ﬁring to signal they are operating on that object. There is evidence consistent with this view. For example, when observers are
presented with an object crossing the vertical meridian, gamma oscillations in the two hemispheres become phase-locked (Rose5 While synchrony also plays an important role at the ‘‘local’’ level within individual cortical regions, it is between-area synchrony which is the focus here.
Such ‘‘inter-areal’’ mechanism is postulated due to the ‘‘global’’ nature of consciousness, i.e. the availability of information to large number of perceptual and
cognitive systems (e.g. Baars, 1988).
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(Martinovic, Gruber, & Muller, 2007).
Consciousness is a ‘‘global’’ function as its hallmark is the availability of information to a large number of perceptual and
cognitive systems. It has been associated with a global workspace (GW) where information is broadcasted to multiple non-
conscious specialized networks, and globally available for cognitive function (Baars, 1988). In its neuronal implementation,
consciousness is a consequence of global ignition of large-scale frontoparietal systems (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene
& Naccache, 2001). Speciﬁcally, a subset of cortical pyramidal cells with long-range excitatory axons together with thalamo-
cortical loops form a horizontal ‘‘neuronal workspace’’ and the hallmark of conscious access is the simultaneous increase in
high-frequency power and synchrony involving prefrontal cortex and other high-level associative cortices (Dehaene &
Changeux, 2011). Also in other theories of awareness, inter-areal synchrony underlies conscious experience. As discussed
in Section 2, Pollen (1999) proposed that for conscious perception to arise, a consensus needs to be reached between the
visual areas that process the given stimulus; this is achieved through feedforward and feedback pathways linking multiple
cortical areas, with synchronous neuronal activity on a short timescale throughout the visual cortex serving as a marker that
a ‘‘steady state’’ (or consensus) has been achieved.
There is an increasing amount of empirical evidence for this view (see e.g. Fries, 2005; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011 for
reviews). For example, in a study by Melloni et al. (2007), both perceived and nonperceived words caused a similar increase
of local gamma oscillations in the EEG, but only perceived words induced a transient long-distance synchronization of
gamma oscillations across widely separated regions of the brain. Wyart and Tallon-Baudry (2008) showed that conscious
perception is associated with increased mid-frequency gamma-band activity over the contralateral visual cortex. In their
study, trial-to-trial ﬂuctuations of activity in the gamma-band not only correlated with visual awareness in stimulus-present
trials but also correlated well with false-alarm reports on stimulus-absent trials.
5.2. Explaining blindsight in terms of ‘‘local’’ vs. ‘‘global’’ visual functions
After a V1 lesion, extrastriate regions can still receive a limited amount of feedforward input. Although the neuronal
responses are severely impoverished, the sharpness of neural tuning can be in normal range: for example, in V5/MT, direc-
tion selectivity can be preserved (Rodman et al., 1989a). This is important because it enables neural computations in which
the ﬁring rates of neurons of different tunings are averaged in order to obtain an estimate of stimulus properties, such as
motion direction (cf. Groh et al., 1997; Nichols & Newsome, 2002). Thus neural read-out of low-level visual information,
which can guide behavior, is possible in the absence of V1. That such meaningful neural computations take place in V5/
MT after a V1 lesion is supported by the ﬁnding that the disruption of this region with TMS impairs blindsight (Cowey &
Alexander, 2009).
The situation is fundamentally different for ‘‘global’’ processes relying on inter-areal synchrony. An important character-
istic of V5/MT responses in adult-lesioned monkeys is the sluggish nature of the responses and abnormally long response
latencies (Azzopardi et al., 2003), indicating that the brisk nature of V5/MT ﬁring found in the normal brain is driven by
excitatory input from V1. Furthermore, V5/MT neurons exhibit abnormally bursty spontaneous activity and high response
variability (Rodman et al., 1989a). While the timing of extrastriate responses in other ipsilesional regions has not been
explicitly investigated, it is likely that similar results are found, given that V1 is their main source of excitatory input and
residual responses in these regions are no more than 20–30% of the response magnitude of pre-lesion levels (Schmid
et al., 2009, 2010, 2013). The critical issue is that the sluggishness and the variability in neuronal responses are likely to pre-
vent the formation of inter-areal neural networks via oscillatory activity, as these require ﬁne temporal resolution. Further-
more, the abnormally burst spontaneous activity is likely to prevent the representation of information by varying the timing
of spikes relative to ongoing neuronal oscillations.
This immediately leads to the question of why V1 damage has such a detrimental effect on neural responses, given that
information can still reach extrastriate cortex through subcortical pathways. Fundamentally, this could be due to its role as a
key hub in the visual cortical hierarchy: it engages in feedforward/feedback activity with a large number of visual regions.
Firstly, V1 provides the vast majority of excitatory extrastriate input; normal functioning might not be possible with a mere
fraction of the normal amount of feedforward activation. Especially the brisk, short-latency responses may be lost. A second
answer relates to the importance of recurrent activity, which modulates neural activity not only in V1 but also in the extras-
triate cortex. For example, as V5/MT-V1 feedback can enhance the activity of V1 neurons projecting to V5/MT, this recurrent
loop allows V5/MT to shape the responses of neurons providing its input, acting as a form of gain control (see e.g. Sillito,
Cudeiro, & Jones, 2006). Thirdly, recurrent activity may be important for maintaining the appropriate baseline oscillatory
activity, in the context of which spiking occurs; there is indeed evidence that recurrency plays a role already in the early
parts of the neural responses (Hupe et al., 2001), and its loss may explain the abnormal nature of spontaneous activity in
the absence of V1. The precise mechanisms by which feedback connections enable neural synchrony require further study.
The key point is that in the absence of recurrent activity involving V1, inter-areal synchrony and therefore conscious percep-
tion cannot arise.
In this view, the content of awareness reﬂects the activity of individual visual areas which form a network through syn-
chronous activity (cf. Pollen, 1999). Extrastriate-V1 feedback is not the pathway to awareness; rather, it plays a role in var-
ious neural processes which are needed for inter-areal synchrony between visual areas to arise. V1 is central due to its
position in the visual cortical hierarchy; it is the most important source of extrastriate input and engages in recurrent loops
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ulating activity in a large number of extrastriate regions simultaneously. However, it is not V1 per se which is critical. If suf-
ﬁciently robust and temporally speciﬁc neural activity can arise via other routes, then V1 would not be required. This may be
occur when patients without V1 can experience conscious percepts in their blind ﬁeld, whether through hemianopic com-
pletion or by TMS. Interestingly, recent evidence suggests that the brisk, short-latency responses of V5/MT neurons can be
preserved if V1 lesion occurs in early age (Yu, Egan, Reser, Worthy, & Rosa, 2013); this might be related to greater preser-
vation of conscious vision after V1 lesion in childhood relative to later in life, and might be due to another cortical area
replacing the role of V1 as a key node in recurrent activity (see Silvanto & Rees, 2011, for a review). When V1 is lesioned
in early development, another region may be able to take over its role as a key node in the visual cortical hierarchy.
In summary, it is proposed that blindsight is blind because in the absence of V1, the extrastriate neurons are unable to
establish inter-areal cortical networks via neural synchrony. However, as some extrastriate neuronal selectivity is preserved,
neural computations in which the ﬁring rates of neurons of different tunings are compared can still operate. This ‘‘local’’ neu-
ral read-out can guide behavior and give rise to blindsight. The range of visual stimuli that can be detected without the
establishment of inter-areal communication is likely to be limited. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that rather
than being a clear dissociation between visual awareness and forced-choice detection, blindsight is a case of severely impov-
erished residual visual function in the absence of visual awareness. As discussed in Section 4.1, only very basic visual features
can be detected by blindsight patients.
At least two complicating issues are worth mentioning. Firstly, ‘‘local’’ and ‘‘global’’ processes are likely to be by no means
mutually exclusive processes, and inter-areal synchrony is likely to modulate the outcome of the ‘‘local’’ neural readout,
although the mechanisms of oscillatory activity and spiking can be to some extent independent (Ardid et al., 2010). Further-
more, if the tuning of V5/MT neurons arises gradually during the neural response through recurrent activity, then it is clear
that the accuracy of the ‘‘local’’ readout is enhanced by it. However, the key point is that a basic form of readout is likely to be
possible in their absence. A second important caveat relates to the distinction between intra-areal and inter-areal synchrony.
Both play an important role in visual cognition and their separate measurement is not always straightforward. For example,
it has been suggested that oscillatory activity in MEG may more likely to reﬂect local synchrony because of its similarity to
patterns of local synchrony observed in intracranial recording (Tallon-Baudry, 2003).6. Conclusions
Blindsight is an important neuropsychological phenomenon for the study of consciousness (Weiskrantz, 1997; Cowey,
2004, 2010). This review aimed to evaluate one speciﬁc theoretical framework derived from blindsight, according to which
recurrent/feedback activity in V1 is the neural signature of phenomenal awareness. There are a number of problems with this
view. Firstly, in neurologically normal observers, feedback activity is important not only for visual awareness but for visual
perception in general, a view proposed by some feedback models (e.g. Bullier, 2001). Secondly, conscious experience in
blindsight patients through hemianopic completion and by TMS indicates that the ipsilateral V1 cannot be the only pathway
to visual awareness. Thirdly, the main tenets on which theories of V1 feedback are based can be questioned; the dissociation
between conscious and unconscious visual function in blindsight is not as robust as often stated, there is doubt as to whether
extrastriate neurons remain sufﬁciently responsive to support awareness after a V1 lesion.
In the view presented here, visual awareness is a ‘‘global’’ phenomenon requiring inter-areal synchronous oscillatory. For
these oscillations to arise, a speciﬁc temporal proﬁle of neuronal activity is required, established through recurrent feedback
activity involving V1 and the extrastriate cortex. When V1 is lesioned, inter-areal networks on the basis of oscillatory activity
cannot be established. Thus visual awareness cannot arise. However, as some extrastriate neuronal selectivity is preserved,
computations in which the responses of neurons of different tunings are compared can still operate. This enables ‘‘local’’ neu-
ral read-out from speciﬁc brain regions which can guide behavior unconsciously, and give rise to blindsight. V1 is important
for awareness not because it acts as a gatekeeper to conscious experience, but because its position in the visual cortical hier-
archy: it is the most important source of excitatory extrastriate input and engages in recurrent loops with a large number of
visual areas.Acknowledgments
The author supported by the Academy of Finland (266789), Emil Aaltonen Foundation, and the European Research Coun-
cil (336152). The author wishes to thank Drs. Christianne Jacobs and Jane Jacob for their comments on the manuscript.References
Adelson, E. H., & Movshon, J. A. (1982). Phenomenal coherence of moving gratings. Nature, 300, 523–525.
Albright, T. D. (1984). Direction and orientation selectivity of neurons in visual area MT of the macaque. Journal of Neurophysiology, 52, 1106–1130.
Albright, T. D., & Stoner, G. R. (2002). Contextual inﬂuences on visual processing. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 25, 339–379.
Alexander, I., & Cowey, A. (2009). The cortical basis of global motion detection in blindsight. Experimental Brain Research, 192, 407–412.
Amassian, V. E., Cracco, R. Q., Maccabee, P. J., Cracco, J. B., Rudell, A., & Eberle, L. (1989). Suppression of visual perception by magnetic coil stimulation of
human occipital cortex. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 74, 458–462.
30 J. Silvanto / Consciousness and Cognition 32 (2015) 15–32Angelucci, A., Levitt, J. B., Walton, E. J., Hupe, J. M., & Bullier, J. (2002). Circuits for local and global signal integration in primary visual cortex. Journal of
Neuroscience, 22, 8633–8646.
Ardid, S., Wang, X. J., & Gomez-Cabrero, D. (2010). Reconciling coherent oscillation with modulation of irregular spiking activity in selective attention:
gamma-range synchronization between sensory and executive cortical areas. Journal of Neuroscience, 24(30(8)), 2856–2870. http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.4222-09.2010.
Azzopardi, P.1, & Cowey, A. (1997). Is blindsight like normal, near-threshold vision? Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America, 9(94(25)), 14190–14194.
Azzopardi, P., & Cowey, A. (2001). Motion discrimination in cortically blind patients. Brain, 124(1), 30–46.
Azzopardi, P., Fallah, M., Gross, C. G., & Rodman, H. R. (2003). Response latencies of neurons in visual areas MT and MST of monkeys with striate cortex
lesions. Neuropsychologia, 41(13), 1738–1756.
Baars, Bernard J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Barbur, J. L., Watson, J. D., Frackowiak, R. S., & Zeki, S. (1993). Conscious visual perception without V1. Brain, 116(Pt 6), 1293–1302.
Barlow, H. (1972). Single units and sensations: A neuron doctrine for perceptual psychology? Perception, 1, 371–394.
Bender, M. B., & Kahn, R. L. (1949). After-imagery in defective ﬁelds of vision. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 12, 196–204.
Block, N. (2005). Two neural correlates of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(2), 46–52.
Boyer, J. L., Harrison, S., & Ro, T. (2005). Unconscious processing of orientation and color without primary visual cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America, 102, 16875–16879.
Bridge, H., Thomas, O., Jbabdi, S., & Cowey, A. (2008). Changes in connectivity after visual cortical brain damage underlie altered visual function. Brain,
131(Pt 6), 1433–1444. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/brain/awn063.
Bullier, J. (2001). Integrated model of visual processing. Brain Research Reviews, 36, 96–107.
Camprodon, J. A., Zohary, E., Brodbeck, V., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2010). Two phases of V1 activity for visual recognition of natural images. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 22(6), 1262–1269. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2009.21253.
Cattaneo, Z., Devlin, J. T., Salvini, F., Vecchi, T., & Silvanto, J. (2010). The causal role of category-speciﬁc neuronal representations in the left ventral premotor
cortex (PMv) in semantic processing. NeuroImage, 49(3), 2728–2734.
Cattaneo, Z., Rota, F., Walsh, V., Vecchi, T., & Silvanto, J. (2009). TMS-adaptation reveals abstract letter selectivity in the left posterior parietal cortex. Cerebral
Cortex, 19(10), 2321–2325.
Christensen, M. S., Kristiansen, L., Rowe, J. B., & Nielsen, J. B. (2008). Action-blindsight in healthy subjects after transcranial magnetic stimulation.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 1353–1357.
Cowey, A. (2004). The 30th Sir Frederick Bartlett lecture. Fact, artefact, and myth about blindsight. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. A, Human
Experimental Psychology, 57(4), 577–609.
Cowey, A. (2010). The blindsight saga. Experimental Brain Research, 200, 3–24.
Cowey, A., & Stoerig, P. (1989). Projection patterns of surviving neurons in the dorsal lateral geniculate nucleus following discrete lesions of the striate
cortex: Implications for residual vision. Experimental Brain Research, 75, 631–638.
Cowey, A., & Walsh, V. (2000). Magnetically induced phosphenes in sighted, blind and blindsighted observers. NeuroReport, 11, 3269–3273.
Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1995). Are we aware of neural activity in primary visual cortex? Nature, 375, 121–123.
de Graaf, T. A., Cornelsen, S., Jacobs, C., & Sack, A. T. (2011). TMS effects on subjective and objective measures of vision: Stimulation intensity and pre- versus
post-stimulus masking. Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 1244–1255.
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J. P. (2011). Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing. Neuron, 70, 200–227.
Dehaene, S., & Naccache, L. (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition, 79, 1–37.
Dreher, B. (1986). Thalamocortical and corticocortical interconnections in the cat visual system: Relation to the mechanisms of information processing. In J.
D. Pettigrew, K. J. Sanderson, & W. R. Levick (Eds.), Visual neuroscience (pp. 290–314). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Edelman, G. M. (1978). Group selection and phasic reentrant signalling: a theory of higher brain function. In G. M. Edelman & V. B. Mountcastle (Eds.), The
mindful brain (pp. 51–100). Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Felleman, D. J., & Van Essen, D. C. (1991). Distributed hierarchical processing in the primate cerebral cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 1, 1–47.
ffytche, D. H., Guy, C. N., & Zeki, S. (1996). Motion speciﬁc responses from a blind hemiﬁeld. Brain, 119(Pt 6), 1971–1982.
Ffytche, D. H., & Zeki, S. (2011). The primary visual cortex, and feedback to it, are not necessary for conscious vision. Brain, 134(Pt 1), 247–257.
Fries, P. (2005). A mechanism for cognitive dynamics: neuronal communication through neuronal coherence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(10), 474–480.
Girard, P., & Bullier, J. (1989). Visual activity in area V2 during reversible inactivation of area 17 in the macaque monkey. Journal of Neurophysiology, 62,
1287–1302.
Girard, P., Salin, P. A., & Bullier, J. (1991). Visual activity in areas V3a and V3 during reversible inactivation of area V1 in the macaque monkey. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 66(5), 1493–1503.
Goebel, R., Muckli, L., Zanella, F. E., Singer, W., & Stoerig, P. (2001). Sustained extrastriate cortical activation without visual awareness revealed by fMRI
studies of hemianopic patients. Vision Research, 41, 1459–1474.
Green, D. M., & Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal detection theory and psy-chophysics. New York: Wiley.
Groh, J., Born, R., & Newsome, W. T. (1997). How is a sensory map read out? Effects of microstimulation in visual area MT on saccades and smooth pursuit
eye movements. Journal of Neuroscience, 17, 4312–4330.
Grossberg, S. (1976). Adaptive pattern classiﬁcation and universal recording: II. Feedback, expectation, olfaction, illusions. Biological Cybernetics, 23(4),
187–202.
Guzmán-López, J., Silvanto, J., & Seemungal, B. M. (2011). Visual motion adaptation increases the susceptibility of area V5/MT to phosphene induction by
transcranial magnetic stimulation. Clinical Neurophysiology, 122(10), 1951–1955.
Guzmán-López, J., Silvanto, J., Yousif, N., Nousi, S., Quadir, S., & Seemungal, B. M. (2011). Probing V5/MT excitability with transcranial magnetic stimulation
following visual motion adaptation to random and coherent motion. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1233(1), 200–207.
Hadjikhani, N., Liu, A. K., Dale, A. M., Cavanagh, P., & Tootell, R. B. (1998). Retinotopy and color sensitivity in human visual cortical area V8. Nature
Neuroscience, 1(3), 235–241.
Heinen, K., Jolij, J., & Lamme, V. A. (2005). Figure-ground segregation requires two distinct periods of activity in V1: A transcranial magnetic stimulation
study. NeuroReport, 16, 1483–1487.
Heller, J., Hertz, J. A., Kjaer, T. W., & Richmond, B. J. (1995). Information ﬂow and temporal coding in primate pattern vision. Journal of Computational
Neuroscience, 2, 175–193.
Heywood, C. A., Gadotti, A., & Cowey, A. (1992). Cortical area V4 and its role in the perception of colour. Journal of Neuroscience, 12, 4056–4065.
Hochstein, S., & Ahissar, M. (2002). View from the top: Hierarchies and reverse hierarchies in the visual system. Neuron, 36, 791–804.
Holmes, G. (1918). Disturbances of visual orientation. The British Journal of Ophthalmology, 2, 449–468.
Horton, J. C., & Hoyt, W. F. (1991). The representation of the visual ﬁeld in human striate cortex: A revision of the classic Holmes map. Archives of
Ophthalmology, 109, 816–824.
Hupe, J. M., James, A. C., Girard, P., Lomber, S. G., Payne, B. R., & Bullier, J. (2001). Feedback connections act on the early part of the responses in monkey
visual cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 85, 134–145.
Hupe, J. M., James, A. C., Payne, B. R., Lomber, S. G., Girard, P., & Bullier, J. (1998). Cortical feedback improves discrimination between ﬁgure and background
by V1, V2 and V3 neurons. Nature, 394, 784–787.
Ilmoniemi, R. J., Virtanen, J., Ruohonen, J., Karhu, J., Aronen, H. J., Naatanen, R., & Katila, T. (1997). Neuronal responses to magnetic stimulation reveal cortical
reactivity and connectivity. Neuroreport, 8(1997), 3537–3540.
J. Silvanto / Consciousness and Cognition 32 (2015) 15–32 31Jacobs, C., de Graaf, T. A., Goebel, R., & Sack, A. T. (2012). The temporal dynamics of early visual cortex involvement in behavioral priming. PLoS One, 7(11),
e48808.
Jolij, J., & Lamme, V. A. (2005). Repression of unconscious information by conscious processing: Evidence from affective blindsight induced by transcranial
magnetic stimulation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102, 10747–10751.
Juan, C. H., Campana, G., & Walsh, V. (2004). Cortical interactions in vision and awareness: hierarchies in reverse. Progress in Brain Research, 144, 117–130.
Koivisto, M., Mantyla, T., & Silvanto, J. (2010). The role of early visual cortex (V1/V2) in conscious and unconscious visual perception. NeuroImage, 51(2),
828–834.
Koivisto, M., Railo, H., Revonsuo, A., Vanni, S., & Salminen-Vaparanta, N. (2011). Recurrent processing in V1/V2 contributes to categorization of natural
scenes. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(7), 2488–2492.
Kölmel, H. W. (1985). Complex visual hallucinations in the hemianopic weld. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 48, 293–298.
Lamme, V. A. (1995). The neurophysiology of ﬁgure-ground segregation in primary visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 15, 1605–1615.
Lamme, V. A. (2001). Blindsight: The role of feedforward and feedback corticocortical connections. Acta Psychologica, 107, 209–228.
Lamme, V. A., & Spekreijse (2000). Modulations of primary visual cortex activity representing attentive and conscious scene perception. Frontiers in
Bioscience, 5, D232–D443.
Lau, H. C. (2008). Are we studying consciousness yet? Oxford University Press.
Laycock, R., Crewther, D. P., Fitzgerald, P. B., & Crewther, S. G. (2007). Evidence for fast signals and later processing in human V1/V2 and V5/MT+: A TMS
study of motion perception. Journal of Neurophysiology, 98(3), 1253–1262.
Lloyd, D. A., Abrahamyan, A., & Harris, J. A. (2013). Brain-stimulation induced blindsight: Unconscious vision or response bias? PLoS One, 8(12), e82828.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0082828.
Marcel, A. J. (1998). Blindsight and shape perception: Deﬁcit of visual consciousness or of visual function? Brain, 121, 1565–1588.
Martinovic, J., Gruber, T., & Muller, M. M. (2007). Induced gamma band responses predict recognition delays during object identiﬁcation. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 19, 921–934.
Maunsell, J. H., Ghose, G. M., Assad, J. A., McAdams, C. J., Boudreau, C. E., & Noerager, B. D. (1999). Visual response latencies of magnocellular and
parvocellular LGN neurons in macaque monkeys. Visual Neuroscience, 16(1), 1–14.
Maunsell, J. H. R., & Van Essen, D. C. (1983a). Functional properties of neurons in middle temporal area of the macaque monkey. I. Selectivity for stimulus
direction. Journal of Neurophysiology, 49, 1127–1147.
Maunsell, J. H. R., & Van Essen, D. C. (1983b). The connections of the middle temporal visual area (MT) and their relationship to a cortical hierarchy in the
macaque monkey. Journal of Neuroscience, 3, 2563–2586.
Maunsell, J. H.1, & Van Essen, D. C. (1987). Topographic organization of the middle temporal visual area in the macaque monkey: representational
biases and the relationship to callosal connections and myeloarchitectonic boundaries. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 22(266(44)), 535–555.
Mazzi, C., Mancini, F., & Savazzi, S. (submitted for publication). Can IPS reach visual awareness without V1? Evidence from TMS in healthy subjects and
hemianopic patients.
Melloni, L., Molina, C., Pena, M., Torres, D., Singer, W., & Rodriguez, E. (2007). Synchronization of neural activity across cortical areas correlates with
conscious perception. Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 2858–2865.
Merigan, W. H.1, Nealey, T. A., & Maunsell, J. H. (1993). Visual effects of lesions of cortical area V2 in macaques. Journal of Neuroscience, 13(7), 3180–3191.
Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H. (1960). Plans and the structure of behaviour. New York: Henry Holt.
Milner, P. M. (1974). A model for visual shape recognition. Psychological Review, 81, 521–535.
Morland, A. B., Ogilvie, J. A., Ruddock, K. H., & Wright, J. R. (1996). Orientation discrimination is impaired in the absence of the striate cortical contribution to
human vision. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 263(1370), 633–640.
Nichols, M. J., & Newsome, W. T. (2002). Middle temporal visual area microstimulation inﬂuences veridical judgments of motion direction. Journal of
Neuroscience, 1(22(21)), 9530–9540.
Nowak, L. G., Munk, M. H., Girard, P., & Bullier, J. (1995). Visual latencies in areas V1 and V2 of the macaque monkey. Visual Neuroscience, 12, 371–384.
Orban, G. A. (1984). Neuronal operations in the visual cortex. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
Parker, A., & Newsome, W. T. (1998). Sense and the single neuron: Probing the physiology of perception. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 21, 227–277.
Pascual-Leone, A., &Walsh, V. (2001). Fast backprojections from the motion to the primary visual area necessary for visual awareness. Science, 292, 510–512.
Perrett, D. I., Rolls, E. T., & Caan, W. (1982). Visual neurones responsive to faces in the monkey temporal cortex. Experimental Brain Research, 47, 329–342.
Pollen, D. A. (1999). On the neural correlates of visual perception. Cerebral Cortex, 9, 4–19.
Pöppel, E., Held, R., & Frost, D. (1973). Residual function after brain wounds involving the central visual pathways in man. Nature, 243, 295–296.
Raiguel, S. E., Lagae, L., Gulyas, B., & Orban, G. A. (1989). Response latencies of visual cells in macaque areas V1, V2, and V5. Brain Research, 493(1), 155–159.
Raiguel, S. E., Xiao, D. K., Marcar, V. L., & Orban, G. A. (1999). Response latency of macaque area MT/V5 neurons and its relationship to stimulus parameters.
Journal Neurophysiol, 82(4), 1944–1956.
Riddoch, G. (1917). Dissociations of visual perceptions due to occipital injuries, with especial reference to appreciation of movement. Brain, 40, 15–57.
Ro, T., Shelton, D., Lee, O. L., & Chang, E. (2004). Extrageniculate mediation of unconscious vision in transcranial magnetic stimulation-induced blindsight.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 101, 9933–9935.
Rosa, M. G., Tweedale, R., & Elston, G. N. (2000). Visual responses of neurons in the middle temporal area of new world monkeys after lesions of striate
cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 15(20(14)), 5552–5563.
Rockland, K. S., & Pandya, D. N. (1979). Laminar origins and terminations of cortical connections of the occipital lobe in the rhesus monkey. Brain Research,
179(1), 3–20.
Rockland, K. S., & Pandya, D. N. (1981). Cortical connections of the occipital lobe in the rhesus monkey: Interconnections between areas 17, 18, 19 and the
superior temporal sulcus. Brain Research, 212(2), 249–270.
Rodman, H. R., Gross, C. G., & Albright, T. D. (1989a). Afferent basis of visual response properties in areas MT of the macaque. I. Effects of striate cortex
removal. Journal of Neuroscience, 9, 2033–2050.
Rodman, H. R., Gross, C. G., & Albright, T. D. (1989b). Afferent basis of visual response properties in areas MT of the macaque. II. Effects of superior colliculus
removal. Journal of Neuroscience, 9, 2033–2050.
Rose, M., Sommer, T., & Büchel, C. (2006). Integration of local features to a global percept by neural coupling. Cerebral Cortex, 16, 1522–1528.
Salminen-Vaparanta, N., Koivisto, M., Noreika, V., Vanni, S., & Revonsuo, A. (2012). Neuronavigated transcranial magnetic stimulation suggests that area V2
is necessary for visual awareness. Neuropsychologia, 50(7), 1621–1627.
Sandrini, M., Umiltà, C., & Rusconi, E. (2011). The use of transcranial magnetic stimulation in cognitive neuroscience: A new synthesis of methodological
issues. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 35(3), 516–536.
Schiller, P. H., & Malpeli, J. G. (1977). The effect of striate cortex cooling on area 18 cells in the monkey. Brain Research, 126, 366–369.
Schmid, M. C., Mrowka, S. W., Turchi, J., Saunders, R. C., Wilke, M., Peters, A. J., et al (2010). Blindsight depends on the lateral geniculate nucleus. Nature,
466(7304), 373–377.
Schmid, M. C., Panagiotaropoulos, T., Augath, M. A., Logothetis, N. K., & Smirnakis, S. M. (2009). Visually driven activation in macaque areas V2 and V3
without input from the primary visual cortex. PLoS One, 4(5), e5527.
Schmid, M. C., Schmiedt, J. T., Peters, A. J., Saunders, R. C., Maier, A., & Leopold, D. A. (2013). Motion-sensitive responses in visual area V4 in the absence of
primary visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(48), 18740–18745.
Schmolesky, M. T., Wang, Y., Hanes, D. P., Thompson, K. G., Leutgeb, S., Schall, J. D., et al (1998). Signal timing across the macaque visual system. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 79(6), 3272–3278.
32 J. Silvanto / Consciousness and Cognition 32 (2015) 15–32Sillito, A. M., Cudeiro, J., & Jones, H. E. (2006). Always returning: Feedback and sensory processing in visual cortex and thalamus. Trends in Neuroscience,
29(6), 307–316.
Silvanto, J. (2013). Transcranial magnetic stimulation and vision. Handbook of Clinical Neurology, 2013(116), 655–669.
Silvanto, J., Cowey, A., Lavie, N., & Walsh, V. (2005). Striate cortex (V1) activity gates awareness of motion. Nature Neuroscience, 8(2), 143–144.
Silvanto, J., Cowey, A., Lavie, N., & Walsh, V. (2007). Making the blindsighted see. Neuropsychologia, 45(14), 3346–3350.
Silvanto, J., Cowey, A., & Walsh, V. (2008). Inducing conscious perception of colour in blindsight. Current Biology, 18, 950–951.
Silvanto, J., Lavie, N., & Walsh, V. (2005). Double dissociation of V1 and V5/MT activity in visual awareness. Cerebral Cortex, 15(11), 1736–1741.
Silvanto, J., & Muggleton, N. G. (2008). New light through old windows: Moving beyond the ‘‘virtual lesion’’ approach to transcranial magnetic stimulation.
NeuroImage, 39(2), 549–552.
Silvanto, J., Muggleton, N. G., Cowey, A., & Walsh, V. (2007). Neural adaptation reveals state-dependent effects of transcranial magnetic stimulation.
European Journal of Neuroscience, 25(6), 1874–1881.
Silvanto, J., & Rees, G. (2011). What does neural plasticity tell us about role of primary visual cortex (V1) in visual awareness? Frontiers in Psychology, 2(2), 6.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00006.
Silvanto, J., Walsh, V., & Cowey, A. (2009). Abnormal functional connectivity between ipsilesional V5/MT+ and contralesional striate cortex (V1) in
blindsight. Experimental Brain Research, 193(4), 645–650.
Singer, W., & Gray, C. M. (1995). Visual feature integration and the temporal correlation hypothesis. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 18, 555–586.
Stoerig, P., & Cowey, A. (1995). Visual perception and phenomenal consciousness. Behavioral Brain Research, 71, 147–156.
Stone, J., Dreher, B., & Leventhal, A. G. (1979). Hierarchical and parallel mechanisms in the organization of visual cortex. Brain Research Reviews, 1, 345–394.
Super, H., Spekreijse, H., & Lamme, V. A. (2001). Two distinct modes of sensory processing observed in monkey primary visual cortex. Nature Neuroscience, 4,
304–310.
Tallon-Baudry, C. (2003). Oscillatory synchrony and human visual cognition. Journal of Physiol-Paris, 97(2–3), 355–363.
Tanaka, K. (1993). Neuronal mechanisms of object recognition. Science., 29(262(5134)), 685–688.
Thielscher, A., Reichenbach, A., Ug˘urbil, K., & Uludag˘, K. (2010). The cortical site of visual suppression by transcranial magnetic stimulation. Cerebral Cortex,
20(2), 328–338.
Tong, F. (2003). Primary visual cortex and visual awareness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4(3), 219–229.
Tootell, R., Nelissen, K., Vanduffel, W., & Orban, G. (2004). Search for ‘colour centre(s)’ in macaque visual cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 14, 353–363.
van de Ven, V., & Sack, A. T. (2013). Transcranial magnetic stimulation of visual cortex in memory: Cortical state, interference and reactivation of visual
content in memory. Behavioural Brain Research, 236(1), 67–77.
Van Essen, D. C., Anderson, C. H., & Felleman, D. J. (1992). Information processing in the primate visual system: an integrated systems perspective. Science.,
24(255(5043)), 419–423. Review.
Van Essen, D. C., & Maunsell, J. H. R. (1983). Hierarchical organization and functional streams in the visual cortex. Trends in Neurosciences, 6, 370–375.
Van Essen, D. C., Maunsell, J. H. R., & Bixby, J. L. (1981). The middle temporal visual area in the macaque: Myeloarchitecture, connections, functional
properties and topographic connections. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 199, 293–326.
Walsh, V., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2003). Transcranial magnetic stimulation: A neurochronometrics of mind (1st ed.). Boston, MA: MIT Press.
Weil, R. S., Plant, G. T., James-Galton, M., & Rees, G. (2009). Neural correlates of hemianopic completion across the vertical meridian. Neuropsychologia, 47,
457–464.
Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A case study and implications. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Weiskrantz L, (1997). Consciousness Lost and Found: A. Neuropsychological Exploration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0198523017.
Weiskranz, L., Warrington, E. K., Sanders, M., & Marshall, J. (1974). Visual capacity in the hemianopic ﬁeld following a restricted cortical ablation. Brain, 97,
709–728.
Wyart, V., & Tallon-Baudry, C. (2008). Neural dissociation between visual awareness and spatial attention. Journal of Neuroscience, 28(10), 2667–2679.
Yu, Chaplin T. A., Egan, G. W., Reser, D. H., Worthy, K. H., & Rosa, M. G. (2013). Visually evoked responses in extrastriate area MT after lesions of striate cortex
in early life. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(30), 12479–12489.
Zeki, S. M. (1973). Colour coding in rhesus monkey prestriate cortex. Brain Research, 53(2), 422–427.
Zeki, S. M. (1974). Functional organization of a visual area in the posterior bank of the superior temporal sulcus of the rhesus monkey. Journal of Physiology-
London, 236, 549–573.
Zeki, S. M. (1977). Colour coding in the superior temporal sulcus of the rhesus monkey visual cortex. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B:
Biological Sciences, 197, 195–223.
Zeki, S. (1978). Functional specialization in the visual cortex of the monkey. Nature, 274, 423–428.
Zeki, S. M., & Bartels, A. (1999). Toward a theory of visual consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 8, 225–259.
Zeki, S. M., Watson, J. D., Lueck, C. J., Friston, K. J., Kennard, C., & Frackowiak, R. S. (1991). A direct demonstration of functional specialization in human visual
cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 11, 641–649.
Zipser, K., Lamme & Schiller, P. H. (1996). Contextual modulation in primary visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 16(22), 7376–7389.
